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Shading a Promise: Interpreting 
the Livelihood Rights Clauses 
in Nineteenth-Century Canadian 
Treaties with First Nations
Arthur J. Ray
Introduction
The Robinson Treaties of 1850 and Treaties 3 to 9 contain variously worded 
clauses that promised First Nations that they would be able to continue to earn 
their livelihoods from the lands they surrendered, in the manners related to devel-
opment. Subsequently, these clauses have been the subject of ongoing treaty rights 
litigation. I will highlight the recurrent issues that I have had to address as an 
expert witness over the past thirty years in cases concerning the Robinson Treaties 
and Treaties 3, 6, 8, and 9. Some of these cases proceeded through trial and appeal 
all the way to the Supreme Court; others never made it to court. Collectively, the 
cases raise two major questions which I will consider in this document: What did 
First Nations and government treaty negotiators intend these clauses to accom-
plish? Have government actions and litigation shaded the promises made long 
ago?
Issues Arising from my Experience as an Expert 
Witness
My involvement in Aboriginal and treaty rights litigation began in 1985 with the 
Treaty 8 hunting rights case Regina v� Horseman (1990).1 It involved the Cree 
hunter, Mr. Bert Horseman, who had killed a grizzly bear in self-defence, but 
subsequently sold the skin in violation of the Alberta Wildlife Act (R.S.A. 1980), 
which protected this endangered species. Mr. Horseman’s lawyer, Ken Starozyck, 
phoned me in 1984 and explained that the case concerned interpretations of the 
clause in Treaty 8 that guaranteed the First Nations who signed it that they and 
their ancestors
shall have right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing through-
out the tract surrendered as hereintofore described, subject to such regulations as may 
from time to time be made by the government of the country, acting under the authority 
of Her Majesty, and saving and accepting such tracts as may be required or taken up from 
time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.2
—  —
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Mr. Starozyck pointed out to me that the clause raised a question about histori-
cal context: What were the usual vocations of the Cree in northern Alberta when 
they signed the treaty in 1899 and 1900? In particular, did their “usual vocations” 
include harvesting for commercial purposes? If the answer was yes, did this 
activity include trading grizzly bear skins? Mr. Starozyck requested that I write 
a report and give oral evidence that addressed these questions and that would 
provide the court with the broader historical context it needed to interpret the 
treaty properly. He thought that would require me to include a broad discussion 
of the western Canadian fur trade during the nineteenth century. After expressing 
some surprise that there was any question about whether Cree who were involved 
in the fur trade of northern Alberta had fished, hunted, and trapped for commercial 
purposes in 1899, I agreed to provide the evidence that Mr. Starozyck requested. 
Data obtained from Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) archives made it abundantly 
clear that the Treaty 8 area had been one of the company’s most important fur-
trading districts in the 1890s. I emphasized in my testimony that the commercial 
and subsistence activities of Aboriginal people were inextricably interconnected.3 
Furthermore, I presented data from the HBC accounts showing that grizzly bear 
pelts had been traded at Fort Vermilion in the 1890s. This post was the one closest 
to where Mr. Horseman had shot the bear. Alberta Provincial Court Justice Wong 
accepted the evidence and ruled that Treaty 8 did promise commercial rights given 
the usual practices of the Cree in 1899. Accordingly, she dismissed the charges 
against Mr. Horseman.
The Alberta government appealed the decision to the Court of Queen’s Bench, 
and rather than challenge the judge’s findings, the Crown contended that the 
Alberta Natural Resources Transfer Agreement (NRTA), as confirmed by the 
Constitution Act (1930), had the effect of limiting Treaty 8 livelihood rights to 
subsistence harvesting. Shifting the focus on appeal to the intention and effect 
of the NRTA raised historical questions that had not been addressed in evidence 
presented at trial. So, at the Court of Queen’s Bench, in support of the province’s 
position, Justice J. Stratton conjured up legislative intent from the text of the 
NRTA and turned to a dictionary for a narrow definition of the word “subsistence.” 
Mr. Horseman then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, where, acting in a 
manner similar to Justice Stratton, a majority of the justices also concluded that 
the drafters of the NRTA intended to limit treaty livelihood rights to subsistence 
harvesting.
The court’s theory was that this curtailment was the quid pro quo for allowing 
First Nations to pursue their harvesting rights throughout Alberta, rather than 
only in their respective treaty regions (Treaties 7 and 8). As Frank Tough’s post-
Horseman research on the NRTA has shown conclusively, this textual rather than 
contextual interpretive approach to the transfer agreements4 led the appeal courts 
to invent a history and draw conclusions from it that are wrong. Tough noted 
that the courts erred in two respects. First, their textual analyses of Paragraph 12 
of the NRTA failed to take into consideration the fact that this section of the act 
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mentioned “trapping” as one of the livelihood rights. Tough notes that the close 
association of trapping with the commercial fur trade should have raised alarm 
bells for the justices who argued that this section of the NRTA was meant to bar 
commercial activities. Second, he points out that because none of the justices had 
researched the drafting of the NRTA, which began in 1926, they were not aware 
that the reference to trapping was added late in the drafting process in response 
to interventions by the HBC, which had a vested interest in Aboriginal peoples 
continuing their involvement in commercial harvesting.5
Soon after the Supreme Court of Canada’s Horseman ruling in 1990, I became 
involved in a number of Treaty 9 (also known as the James Bay Treaty) rights 
cases in Ontario, where the NRTA did not apply. The first of these was Regina v� 
Spade, Regina v� Wassaykessic, which took place in a small provincial courtroom 
in Thunder Bay, Ontario, in the autumn of 1992.6 The defendants, Ivan Spade 
and Isaiah Wassaykesic, were from the Mishkeegogamang (New Osnaburg) First 
Nation. Mr. Spade had been charged with unlawfully selling migratory birds 
contrary to Section 5 of the Migratory Birds Convention Act7 and Mr. Wassaykes-
sic with unlawfully selling sturgeon contrary to the Ontario Game and Fish Act 
(R.S.O. 1990, Chapter G.1).8 The defendants’ lawyer, Mary Bird, wanted me to 
educate the court about the commercial hunting and fishing activities that the First 
Nations of the southern portions of the Treaty 9 region (south of the Albany River) 
had been engaged in as participants in the fur trade prior to 1905.
Having been called in at the last moment when a previously contracted expert 
withdrew, I did not have time to prepare a brief for the court. So, I presented 
what was essentially one of the routine fur trade lectures that I gave every year 
in my Native History course concerning the importance of “country provisions” 
(food and commodities other than furs that were supplied by Aboriginal people) 
to the operations of the HBC. These provisions included an array of fresh and 
preserved foodstuffs. The trial judge was very receptive to my “lecture,” thanking 
me afterward. He was a self-confessed “fur trade buff,” who indicated that he had 
just read author and journalist Peter C. Newman’s account of the thousands of 
geese that the Swampy Cree killed every year for the HBC’s posts on James Bay 
during the eighteenth century.9 Not surprisingly, in the end the judge affirmed that 
commercial harvesting was a usual vocation of Treaty 9 First Nations long before 
1905.10
Immediately after Spade and Wassaykessic, I became involved in another 
Treaty 9 fishing rights case. It arose in the autumn of 1992, when the Ontario 
Crown laid a charge against Mr. Eli Moonias. At the time, the defendant was 
the chief of the Marten Falls First Nation.11 He also operated a fishing company. 
The Crown charged Chief Moonias with exceeding the quota of his commer-
cial licence to fish for sturgeon on the Albany River. Chief Moonias wanted to 
confront this charge for two reasons: he believed that his treaty rights exempted 
him from having a quota imposed and, alternatively, he considered the quota to be 
arbitrary because the Crown had not provided any biological data about the size 
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or health of the Albany River sturgeon population. In other words, the Crown had 
not proven the need for the conservation measure it had imposed.
Chief Moonias made his claim in the immediate aftermath of the landmark R� v� 
Sparrow Aboriginal (1990) fishing rights case from British Columbia. In the latter 
case, Mr. Ronald Sparrow of the Musqueam First Nation of British Columbia 
had been charged with fishing for salmon with a drift net that was longer than 
the band’s Indian food fishing licence permitted.12 The federal fisheries depart-
ment had issued the licence with net size restrictions for conservation purposes. 
Sparrow’s defence was that the regulation infringed on his Aboriginal rights 
according to Section 35 (1) of the Constitution Act (1982). In response to Mr. 
Sparrow’s appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that legislation can curtail Aboriginal 
rights if there is a valid objective and the restriction is consistent with the special 
trust relationship created by history, treaties, and legislation, and the responsibility 
of the government vis-à-vis Aboriginal peoples. The court concluded in Sparrow 
that conservation objectives do warrant placing restrictions on Aboriginal rights 
provided that any infringement is limited to what is required to accomplish the 
desired conservation results.13
With this ruling in mind, Chief Moonias’s lawyer, Mr. Francis Thatcher, asked 
me to prepare a brief on behalf of his client, which focused on the Aboriginal 
peoples’ consumption and exchange of fish and wildlife in northern Ontario 
before the negotiation of Treaty 9 in 1905.14 He was particularly interested in 
obtaining archival data about the size and nature of Native fisheries—especially 
the sturgeon fishery of the Albany River. He anticipated that the HBC records 
would show that commercial fishing had been a common activity of people from 
Marten Falls First Nation and their neighbours. Mr. Thatcher also hoped that 
archival data might provide some idea of what the long-term sustainability of an 
Albany River sturgeon fishery might be.
I hired a team of research assistants to help me, and we examined all of the 
records in the HBC archives pertaining to the company’s posts in the Treaty 9 
region, which approximates the territory of the former southern department of the 
HBC. We began with the earliest accounts from Fort Albany dating back to the 
early eighteenth century. The data we collected made it clear that Native fisheries 
became increasingly important to fur-trading operations as fur and game animal 
populations declined because of overhunting and trapping. Aboriginal people 
participated in local commercial fisheries in various ways. They supplied fish as 
an article of commerce, they fished seasonally on contract, and some of them 
fished as salaried seasonal or regular company employees. The relative impor-
tance of these various kinds of arrangements to the overall fish procurement of the 
company varied considerably from post to post in the late nineteenth century.
Of particular relevance to Chief Moonias’s defence, the documentary records 
indicated that in the late nineteenth century the Marten Falls Post relied heavily 
on whitefish taken by seine fisheries15 operated mostly by Aboriginal men who 
were retained on contract.16 The post managers often referred to them in general 
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terms as “our fishers” or “the fishermen.”  The fishers named most often from 
1869 to 1899 included Old Betsy (and her daughter), Lame Man (and his sister), 
Old Sturgeon, Moss Sturgeon, Sandy Sturgeon, Osshkapay (and his brother), 
and Patrick and Jack Wich ee capay (and his sister).17 The post supplied these 
and other Native contract fishers with salt, kegs, nets, and sometimes canoes and 
tents. Fishers on contract usually received small advances and were paid for their 
catches once they delivered them to the post. Sometimes the post manager hired 
Aboriginal people to pack the fish in kegs for the fishers and haul them to the 
post.18 Of the various seasonal fisheries, the autumn whitefish fishery was the 
most crucial one for Marten Falls, as it was for most posts in the region.
Whereas most of the fish that native fishers caught on contract were salted, 
those brought in by natives for trade mostly had been “hung” (dried and/or 
lightly smoked), although some was fresh. Whitefish and suckers dominated the 
trade judging from the journals, but sturgeon was also important.19 One of Chief 
Moonias’s ancestors was mentioned in this trade. The Marten Falls journals show 
that some of the Aboriginal men and women who fished on contract also sold fish 
in the off-season. As noted, women also took part in the trade. The records from 
other Hudson’s Bay Company posts on the Albany River are much less extensive 
than those for Marten Falls, but suggest similar patterns nonetheless. Collectively, 
the data from the HBC post records highlighted the importance of fishing for 
commercial purposes throughout the Albany River drainage basin.
After my research team completed their work, I summarized the results in 
a 271-page report that I submitted to Mr. Thatcher in June 1993.20 I never had 
the opportunity of presenting it in court, however. This was because provincial 
Crown attorneys withdrew the charges against Chief Moonias ten days before the 
trial was scheduled to begin. The justification for doing so was that the lawyers 
had concluded that there was insufficient scientific evidence to prove or to justify 
the element of conservation beyond a reasonable doubt.21
Treaty Intentions
These experiences, and my subsequent involvement in Regina v� Powley (2003), 
concerning Métis hunting rights in Ontario in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie, led 
me to the conclusion that too much attention has been focused on commercial 
versus subsistence harvesting. Likewise, litigation, especially in criminal cases 
arising from violations of federal and provincial conservation legislation, is too 
species-specific. These types of cases, as those I have been involved with illus-
trate, usually require that First Nations (and Métis) defendants prove that their 
ancestors harvested a particular species of game, fur-bearers, waterfowl, or fish. 
This brings us to two basic contextual questions. In the nineteenth century, was 
it the practice of First Nations or government treaty negotiators to frame their 
discussions in such specific terms? This raises a related and more basic question: 
What were the purposes of the livelihood rights clauses?
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The Historical Context for the Original Livelihood Rights Clauses: 
The Robinson Treaties, 1850
When reflecting on treaty-making in western Canada to 1880, Alexander Morris, 
who had been involved in the process as lieutenant-governor of Manitoba (1872–
77) and of the Northwest Territories (1872–76), observed that the Numbered 
Treaties 
are all based upon the models of that made at the Stone Fort in 1871 and the one made 
in 1873 at the northwest angle of Lake of the Woods with the Chippewa tribes, and these 
again are based, in many material features, on those made by the Hon. W. B. Robinson 
with the Chippewas dwelling on the shores of Lakes Huron and Superior in 1850.22
The Robinson Treaties were the first to include the livelihood rights clauses. 
Specifically, these treaties stated:
The said William Benjamin Robinson of the first part, on behalf of Her Majesty and the 
Government of this Province, hereby promises and agrees … to allow the said Chiefs and 
their Tribes the full and free privilege to hunt over the Territory now ceded by them, and 
to fish in the waters thereof, as they have heretofore been in the habit of doing; saving and 
excepting such portions of the said Territory as may from time to time be sold or leased 
to individuals or companies of individuals, and occupied by them with the consent of the 
Provincial Government.23
This clause, the essence of which is repeated in later treaties with variable wording, 
has two important aspects. The first addresses the First Nations goal of protecting 
their right to continue traditional livelihood pursuits, which they could not do if 
they were restricted to reserves. The second deals with Canada’s primary concern 
of opening the territory for colonial development. In the case of the Robinson 
Treaties, the primary objective was to facilitate mining. The clause accommo-
dated the concerns of both parties, giving the Aboriginal people free access to all 
areas not physically altered by colonial development projects. Very importantly, 
the clause put no restrictions on hunting or fishing by Aboriginal people. Rather 
it gave them “full and free privilege” to do so. To understand why the Robinson 
Treaties granted such liberal livelihood rights, it is important to consider how the 
local economic situation affected Robinson’s negotiating position. These local 
circumstances predisposed him to make certain kinds of accommodations to 
convince the Aboriginal people that it was in their interest to reach an agreement 
with him.
I began research into the early nineteenth century Native economies of the 
Robinson Treaties area in the late 1990s when Jean Teillet, who was legal council 
for Métis hunters Steve and Rodney Powley of Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, asked 
me to prepare a report for her clients. They had been charged with hunting moose 
without first obtaining a provincial hunting tag in violation of the Ontario Game 
and Fish Act. They claimed they had an Aboriginal right to do so because it was 
the usual custom of their ancestors to hunt before the Crown asserted effective 
control over the Upper Great Lakes area. In my preparation for the case, I focused 
on the nature of the Aboriginal economies (First Nations and Métis) in the Great 
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Lakes area during the first half of the nineteenth century.24 This research revealed 
that the Aboriginal people of Lake Huron and Lake Superior had very different 
sets of economic priorities that they brought to the bargaining table. The southern 
groups had more diversified economies and wanted to hold out for much higher 
compensation than Robinson offered for relinquishing lands and the rights to 
grant mining leases. The northern groups, in contrast, were much more dependent 
on the fur trade. The problem for them was that the 1840s was a time when they 
were suffering economic hardships because of fur and game depletion and low 
fur prices. These northern groups believed that they could address their pressing 
needs through a treaty by securing annuity incomes that would supplement what 
they earned from traditional harvesting activities. Of particular importance, this 
new source of income would enable them to buy the equipment and supplies that 
were essential for fishing, hunting, and trapping without having to go heavily into 
debt to fur traders. In other words, annuities could help them live off the land and 
subsidize their participation in the fur trade.
When Robinson faced stiff bargaining from the southern groups, he decided to 
take advantage of the fact that the northern and interior First Nations and Métis 
had a different set of economic priorities. Therefore, he headed north to Lake 
Superior where he was in a stronger negotiating position. Here the fur trade-
dependent groups quickly agreed to a treaty. This left their southern relatives with 
little choice but to follow suit. They signed the Robinson Huron Treaty a month 
later.25
Although Robinson did not keep a detailed record of his negotiations during 
the summer of 1850, on September 24, 1850, he wrote a lengthy covering letter 
(essentially a report) when transmitting copies of the treaties to the superintendent 
general of Indian affairs, Colonel Bruce. In this letter, Robinson makes it clear how 
he addressed the various economic concerns of the Aboriginal people. Regarding 
the issue of valuing the land north of Lakes Huron and Superior relative to that in 
the rest of Canada West, he wrote: 
I explained to the chiefs in council the difference between the lands ceded heretofore in 
this Province, and those then under consideration, they [the former] were of good quality 
and sold readily at prices which enabled the government to be more liberal, they were 
also occupied by the whites in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of the Indian 
hunting over or having access to them.
Regarding the subject of hunting, he continued: 
Whereas the lands now ceded are notoriously barren and sterile, and will in all prob-
ability never be settled except in a few localities by mining companies, whose establish-
ments among the Indians, instead of being prejudicial, would prove of great benefit as 
they would afford a market for any things they may have to sell, and bring provisions and 
stores of all kinds among them at reasonable prices”26 (emphasis added). 
In other words, Robinson’s own words indicated that he had pitched the treaties 
with promises that the development would enhance rather than restrict Aboriginal 
commercial hunting and fishing prospects by opening up additional local markets. 
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It would also break the retailing monopoly of the HBC. Robinson advised Bruce 
that guaranteeing Aboriginal people their traditional livelihoods would save the 
government from the risk of having them make future claims on the treasury:
In allowing the Indians to retain reservations of land for their own use I was governed by 
the fact that they in most cases asked for such tracts as they had theretofore been in the 
habit of using for purposes of residence and cultivation, and by securing these to them 
and the right of hunting and fishing over the ceded territory, they cannot say that the 
government takes from their usual means of subsistence and therefore have no claims for 
support, which they no doubt would have preferred, had this not been done.27 (emphasis 
added)
Although Morris stated in 1880 that the Robinson Treaties, Treaties 1 and 2 of 
1871,28 and Treaty 3 of 1873 served as models for those that followed (Treaties 
4, 5, 6, and 7), curiously the texts of the 1871 agreements fail to include the 
livelihood rights clauses of the earlier Robinson and later treaties. The omission 
is even more puzzling considering that it was one of the “outside promises” that 
were made verbally by government negotiators.29 According to written accounts 
of the treaty talks, for example, in his opening address to the assembled chiefs, 
lieutenant-governor of Manitoba and the Northwest Territories, Adams Archibald 
(1870–72), promised: 
When you have made your treaty you will still be free to hunt over much of the land 
included in the treaty. Much of it is rocky and unfit for cultivation, much of it that is 
wooded is beyond places where the white man will require to go … for some time to 
come. 
He continued: 
Till these lands are needed for use you will be free to hunt over them, and make all the 
use of them which you have made in the past. But when the lands are needed to be tilled 
or occupied, you must not go on them any more.30
Considering the time, Wemyss Simpson would have understood that making 
“all the use” of the land would have involved commercial harvesting of fish 
and wildlife. For instance, in a letter he wrote to the secretary of state for the 
provinces in November 1871, Simpson commented on the treaties he had just 
concluded. His reflections indicate awareness that the treaty would subsidize the 
First Nations’ long-standing participation in the fur trade, which probably helped 
make it appealing to them. For example, regarding the annuity provision of $3 per 
person, Simpson said: 
The sum of three dollars does not appear to be large enough to enable an Indian to provide 
himself with many of his winter necessaries, but as he receives the same amount for his 
wife, or wives, and for each of his children, then the aggregate sum is usually sufficient 
to procure many comforts for his family which he would otherwise be compelled to deny 
himself.31 
His mention of “winter necessaries” no doubt was a reference to “winter outfits.” 
The latter was the term fur traders commonly used when referring to the credit 
they gave to their native clients in the autumn in the form of equipment that was 
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needed for hunting, trapping, and fishing (ammunition, nets and/or net lines, 
twine, traps, hatchets, knives, etc.) and a few so-called “luxury items” (mostly tea 
and tobacco). By 1870, Aboriginal people of the central and the western interior 
areas of Canada had been accustomed to receiving outfits for a period from a 
century and a half to nearly two centuries. As I have noted elsewhere, in the 1870s 
$16 or more per family would have paid for a significant portion of the goods 
that constituted a typical winter outfit, albeit the First Nations of Treaties 1 and 2 
subsequently thought it was not adequate.32
The livelihood rights clause that was omitted from the text of Treaties 1 and 2 
reappears in Treaty 3, but a significant qualification was added. It stated that First 
Nations harvesting pursuits would be “subject to such regulations as may from 
time to time be made by the government.”33 The documentary record of the nego-
tiations provides no insight about why the rights clause had been reintroduced with 
this stipulation. On the contrary, the written records of the treaty talks suggest that 
livelihood rights received little, if any, attention. The parties appear to have been 
preoccupied with other issues. The most important of these were the demands by 
the First Nations living in the southern portions of the future Treaty 3 area that 
they be paid more for their lands than the government was prepared to offer. These 
First Nations understood that their lands were located in a zone where the govern-
ment wanted to build railway and telegraph lines, develop timber resources, and 
anticipated that mining developments would take place there. Already steamboats 
plied the boundary waters (Rainy River—Lake of the Woods), a wagon road (the 
Dawson Road) had been constructed leading from the Rainy River northwest to 
Red River, and towns were developing. This led the First Nations living in the 
vicinity of the Canada-United States border also to demand compensation for the 
wood already used for these developments and for use of the waterways. Because 
they already were benefiting from the opportunities this new economic growth 
brought, these First Nations could afford to hold out for better terms than Canada 
initially offered.
Morris, who had replaced Archibald as lieutenant-governor of Manitoba and 
the Northwest Territories, said of these hard bargainers: “The Rainy River Indians 
were careless about the treaty, because they could get plenty of money for cutting 
wood for the boats.”34 The result was that Morris and his fellow commissioners 
spent most of their time trying to come to terms with these southern First Nations. 
In the end, Morris had to raise annuity payments to five dollars as one way of 
gaining an agreement from them.
The other strategy involved adopted the kind of “divide and conquer” strategy 
that Robinson used in 1850. This involved appealing to groups who lived in areas 
remote from the Rainy River-Lake of the Woods corridor. They had a different 
economic agenda, which predisposed them to making a treaty. Morris said of them: 
“The northern and eastern bands were anxious for one.”35 This was because these 
First Nations’ greater dependency on the fur trade put them in a weak bargain-
ing position. By the early 1870s, the world was heading into a major economic 
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downturn and fur prices had started to decline, which would continue until 1885.36 
The difficulty the northern and eastern First Nations faced was exacerbated by 
increasingly frequent failures of the hunts. A treaty offered them the prospect of 
addressing these urgent economic problems. A Lac Seul chief representing about 
four hundred individuals made this clear to Morris. He said that his followers 
wanted a treaty that would provide them with support for their traditional liveli-
hood pursuits in the form of allowances of ammunition and twine as well as help 
in developing agriculture. The chief noted that some of his people already planted 
small plots of corn and potatoes to guard against the increasingly frequent food 
shortages that resulted from poor hunts.37 Seeing an opportunity to break the ranks 
of the assembled chiefs, Morris and his fellow treaty commissioners responded 
to the overture of the Lac Seul chief by adding to the treaty package a $1,500 
per annum allowance for ammunition, fishnet twine, seeds, and implements for 
those who were doing some farming. So, once again, provisions in the treaty were 
aimed at sustaining traditional livelihood practices, which included involvement 
in all commercial aspects of the fur trade.
Conclusion
The preceding discussion has focused on the livelihood rights clauses of the 
Robinson Treaties and Treaty 3, which Alexander Morris said served as models 
for later agreements, and the verbal promises made in Treaties 1 and 2. In the 
negotiations for all of these treaties, the Aboriginal peoples would have brought 
perspectives to the treaty table that were based on a tradition of involvement in the 
fur trade for a century and a half or more. For them, the commercial harvesting of 
a wide range of fish and wildlife species had long been a usual vocation. As we 
have seen, Robinson appealed to this fact in 1850 to win over those First Nations 
in the Great Lakes who remained highly dependent on the fur trade. He did so as 
a way of outmanoeuvring groups that had economic alternatives that put them in 
stronger bargaining positions. Twenty-three years later, Morris, who was familiar 
with Robinson’s tactic, faced similar negotiating problems and opportunities in 
Treaty 3. Although Morris did not say he used the same sales pitch to woo the fur 
trade-dependent groups, he did amend the treaty package to include provisions 
that helped subsidize their continued participation in the fur trade.
None of the treaty talks I have discussed here indicate that any of the parties 
involved thought about livelihood rights in the species-specific or commercial-
versus-subsistence terms that have become commonplace in rights litigation. The 
latter perspective is one that derives from the post-conservation legislation era 
and legal strategizing. As I have noted, in terms of the realities of Aboriginal 
economic life and ecological circumstances, it makes no sense to think this way 
because flexibility was the key to long-term economic survival. Aboriginal people 
had to adjust their harvesting strategies to accommodate fish and wildlife cycles 
as well as fluctuating markets.
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Although Morris added a qualifier to the livelihood rights clause in Treaty 
3, which is replicated in the subsequent Numbered Treaties, I think it is highly 
unlikely that he thought the phrase would have facilitated the subsequent placement 
of substantial restrictions of First Nations livelihood rights. Evidence for this is 
suggested in the concluding chapter of his monograph of 1880 that dealt with 
treaty administration. Here he summarized the seven main features of the treaties 
negotiated from 1850 to 1877. Regarding the livelihood rights dimension, Morris 
said that in return for relinquishing “all the great region from Lake Superior to 
the foot of the Rocky Mountains” the government granted: “permission to the 
Indians to hunt over the ceded territory and to fish in the waters thereof, excepting 
such portions of the territory as pass from the Crown into occupation of individu-
als or otherwise.”38 Strikingly, Morris did not mention that this right was subject 
to government regulation. His comment on this dimension of the treaties does 
highlight the key purpose of the livelihood clauses, however. Aboriginal people 
were to be guaranteed the right to continue their usual vocations only on lands 
not taken up by development. That was the key restriction. It was essential for 
the achievement of the primary intention of the livelihood rights clauses. That 
was to prevent conflict between settlers and Aboriginal people arising from non-
compatible land usage. The clauses were neither intended to curtail commercial 
harvesting of fish and wildlife resources by First Nations nor to serve as a means 
by which settlers could appropriate those resources for commercial or recreation 
purposes.
Nonetheless, subsequent treaty rights litigation and legislation before 1982, 
when Aboriginal and treaty rights received constitutional protection, has had that 
effect. This has meant that First Nations have had to wage a costly fight against 
the narrowing of a broadly framed treaty right on a group-by-group, species-by-
species basis. Many are reluctant to sue for commercial harvesting rights in the 
knowledge that they likely will fail, or at best will be granted only sharply limited 
commercial rights. In these ways, the primary intent of the original promises has 
been shaded and diminished.
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